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Abstract 
This paper uses ideas from artificial intelligence to show how default notions can be defined 
over Scott domains. We combine these ideas with ideas arising in domain theory to shed some 
light on the properties of nonmonotonicity in a general model-theoretic setting. 
We consider in particular a notion of default nonmonotonic entailment between prime open 
sets in the Scott topology of a domain. We investigate in what ways this notion obeys the so- 
called laws of cautious monotony and cautious cut, proposed by Gabbay, Kraus, Lehmann, and 
Magidor. Our notion of nonmonotonic entailment does not necessarily satisfy cautious monotony, 
but does satisfy cautious cut. In fact, we show that any reasonable notion of nonmonotonic 
entailment on prime opens over a Scott domain, satisfying in particular the law of cautious cut, 
can be concretely represented using our notion of default entailment. 
We also give a variety of sufficient conditions for defaults to induce cumulative entailments, 
those satisfying cautious monotony. In particular, we show that defaults with unique extensions 
are a representation of cumulative nonmonotonic entailment. Furthermore, a simple characteri- 
zation is given for those default sets which determine unique extensions in coherent domains. 
Finally, a characterization is given for Scott domains in which default entailment must be cumu- 
lative. This is the class of daisy domains; it is shown to be Cartesian closed, a purely domain- 
theoretic result. 
1. Introduction 
Why should the topic of domain theory have any connection with default reasoning, 
as commonly understood in artificial intelligence (AI)? Our basic observation is that 
partial information is a fundamental concept shared by both areas. Essentially, do- 
main theory is about partial information: elements of a domain are partial objects, and 
total objects can be approximated by increasingly better approximations. Nonmonotonic 
reasoning, on the other hand, is also about partial information, though traditionally in 
AI it has been represented either disjunctively in theories, or model-theoretically by 
means of large structures of total models. There is growing awareness in AI of the 
importance of the idea: see, for example, the book on the topic [ 181. Our contribution 
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in this respect is merely a new technical tool. In particular, though, it focuses on the 
concept of observability as the kind of property from which we can jump to new 
conclusions. 
Domain theory has provided quite a lot of insight into structures of partial infor- 
mation. So, in addition to the ideas from AI which provide some new techniques 
for the study of general nonmonotonic phenomena in domains, we hope that, even- 
tually, domain-theoretic insights can help resolve some of the anomalies which seem 
to plague default reasoning in AI. We are, however, not claiming that domain theory 
can be so applied without much work. Traditionally, domain theory deals mostly with 
monotonic, continuous functions. The challenges seem to be to find the right interface 
between nonmonotonic reasoning and domain theory, and to develop a basic theory on 
a special class of nonmonotonic functions. 
1.1. Nonmonotonic reasoning 
Your friend’s flight is scheduled to arrive at 12 noon. So you left home around 
10:3Oam to meet him at the airport. At the airport, you are told that the flight has 
been delayed and it will be arriving at 1 pm instead. (But if you knew the flight 
was delayed for an hour before leaving home, you probably would not have left 
home around lo:30 am.) 
This is a typical scenario considered in common sense (prototypical) reasoning in 
artificial intelligence. A key property in common sense reasoning is that the conclusions 
made are only tentative (such as “arriving on time”), and may be defeated in light of 
new information. Because of this, the reasoning involved is called nonmonotonic. If 
we let S stand for “scheduled to arrive at noon”, A for “does arrive at noon”, and D 
for “delayed”, then A follows tentatively from S, but not from both S and D together. 
The “non-monotonicity” mentioned above refers to the fact that we decrease our store 
of facts by retracting A when we get the new information D. Intuitively, weakening 
fails. 
Developing formal systems that capture this process turns out to be extremely inter- 
esting and challenging. In AI there has been more than a decade’s work in this area. 
Some notable approaches include McCarthy’s circumscription [9], Reiter’s default logic 
[ 121, and McDermott and Doyle’s autoepistemic logic [lo]. A great deal is now known 
about these logics, though there are well-known problems with each of the approaches. 
Take Reiter’s default logic, for example. This is an augmentation of first order logic 
with extended rules called defaults. Extensions are a basic notion in default logic 
because these stand for sets of conclusions made using “common sense assumptions” 
embodied in the default rules. However, the following properties are often considered 
undesirable: 
l There can be multiple extensions. 
l Extensions may not exist. 
l Even when they do exist, it can be too costly or impossible to find them. 
l Default logic does not support the familiar principle of reasoning by cases [2,8]. 
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l Standard entailment in default logic fails to have the so-called cumulativity prop- 
erty M. 
A possible reason why the current approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning have 
achieved only limited success may be that the approaches presume the syntax and 
the total model theory used in classical first order logic. ’ This presents a fundamental 
mismatch between the theoretical tool on the one hand, and the phenomena one wants 
to describe on the other. The basic view of classical logic is total: every issue is settled 
as either true or false, and truth values never change. In common sense reasoning, our 
conclusions cannot be supported by proofs in the mathematical sense, and we need 
to take action in situations of partial information. The only place such information 
resides, in traditional default logic, is in the incompleteness of default theories. But it 
seems that the lack of information about an airplane’s arrival time is not well captured 
by several incomplete scientific theories of its particular flight. Instead, we propose to 
use defaults to complete this particular scenario by adding conjunctive atomic “facts” 
which are coherent with constraints on any total picture. We then reason about such 
extended pictures with traditional logics adapted for partial models. So instead of hav- 
ing several default theories (traditional extensions), we will have one default theory 
of this model: that theory which contains all sentences observably true in the model- 
theoretic extensions of the incomplete picture (this view will be fully explicated in our 
other papers). 
Default domain theory (DDT), as developed in [ 13-16,191, results from a marriage 
of domain theory with techniques from default logic. We summarize some of its key 
ideas. 
Reiter’s default rules can be regarded as semantic, not syntactic notions. In default 
logic, systems of defaults are interpreted proof-theoretically. In default model theory, 
systems of defaults are used to build partial models. 
We have generalized Scott’s information systems to the setting of default reason- 
ing. The notion of a “base theory” in default logic is replaced by the notion of a 
“base situation”, or partial world. The notion of “extension” is retained, but now 
refers not to a collection of theories, but to a collection of situations, each con- 
taining more information than the base situation. Our use of the term situation is 
informal throughout the paper. However, there is much in common between DDT 
and situation theory [3]. For a much more explicit connection, see our paper [ 151. 
To reason about what happens in a base situation and its extensions, we have introdu- 
ced several modal logics. All of them involve a modal operator B for belief. By holds 
in a given situation s iff cp holds in all extensions of s. Since the notion of validity 
in a model is primitive in our treatment, the modal logics are semantics based. 
Here is how DDT gets around, for example, the problem of multiple extensions. 
When extensions are regarded as partial (possible) worlds, the extension relation is 
similar to the accessibility relation in Kripke structures. A default rule functions here 
’ Of course, probabilistic tools can and have been used for this purpose. But in many cases, probability 
distributions and/or statistical information is unavailable. 
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not as an extended proof rule, but as part of a procedure for building an agent’s pre- 
ferred worlds extending the current one. There can be many different worlds reachable 
from the current world. So the possibility of multiple extensions becomes a feature, 
not a bug - Kripke structures would be rather uninteresting if there were only one 
world accessible from the current one. 
When defaults are regarded as a constructive method for building worlds, we can in- 
vestigate different model building procedures. Reiter’s extension operator, when phrased 
model-theoretically, remains one of the key “algorithms” for building preferred worlds. 
However, extensions may not exist in some reasonable cases. To cope with this, we 
have introduced the notion of a “dilation” [14], a robust generalization of the notion 
of an extension. Dilations exist in all reasonable cases. 
Finally, we need to stress the analogy between default systems and programs. 
In domain theory, the meaning or behavior of a program is interpreted as an ele- 
ment of a domain (traditionally a Scott domain). Our observation is that one can also 
interpret a system of defaults in this behavioral way; as being a kind of user-specified 
“program” whose meaning is not a given domain element, but a nondeterministic and 
nonmonotonic way of extending such an element. 
1.2. Nonmonotonic entailment 
The basic notion underlying a standard logic is that of an entailment. Traditionally, 
we say a (finite) set of formulas C entails a formula $ if every model of C is a model 
of $. A basic property of this entailment is monotonicity: if C entails II/ and C C C’, 
then, of course, C’ entails $. 
In the nonmonotonic case, what kind of entailment is appropriate? A considerable 
amount of work has been devoted to this basic question since the work of Gabbay [4]. 
Because there is no widely accepted model theory for nonmonotonic entailment, most 
other work does not follow the tradition in standard Tarskian logic: postulates about 
properties of nonmonotonic entailment come first, models next. However, the justifi- 
cation and consequences of the various postulates are not understood to the extent we 
would like. Another approach, as taken in this paper, is to start from a model theory and 
let the models guide our way, in the tradition of Tarskian logic. We use the class of de- 
fault models, which appears in this paper as a class of default domains and extensions. 
The usual interpretation of X -+ a (where --+ stands for the nonmonotonic entailment 
relation) is that from the information X we can jump to the conclusion a. Many authors, 
in particular Kraus et al. [7], have considered Gabbay’s axiom of cautious monotony: 
X-+a&X-+b+X,a-+b. 
Reasoning with the assumption of this law, together with some other routine axioms, 
is sometimes called cumulative reasoning. We have found, however, that cumulativity 
fails given our setting. (See examples in the last section.) One cause of this failure 
is that disjunction can be used in the setting where pieces of information have propo- 
sitional structure. This may lead us to believe that a similar failure would not occur 
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without disjunctions; but we have found that even this is not true. Much of the paper 
is concerned with ways to get around this problem. 
1.3. Contributions of the paper 
We introduce the basic concept of defaults in Scott domains and show some basic 
properties related to extensions in Section 2. In Section 3, after a detailed discus- 
sion of some useful axioms related to abstract nonmonotonic entailment, we show that 
default domains are a concrete representation of these nomnonotonic entailments. In 
Section 4 we provide a variety of sufficient conditions for defaults to induce cumulative 
entailments, those satisfying cautious monotony. In particular, we show that defaults 
with unique extensions are a representation of cumulative nonmonotonic entailment. 
Furthermore, we obtain a simple characterization for those default sets which deter- 
mine unique extensions in coherent domains (they are different from coherent spaces!). 
In Section 5, we give a characterization of those Scott domains which guarantee cu- 
mulativity no matter what default sets are used. We show that those domains can be 
made into a Cartesian closed category. Finally, nonmonotonic entailment is extended to 
general Scott open sets, and several results for this case are provided. 
2. Default domain theory 
Originally, default domain theory was based on default information structures, 
augmenting a concrete representation of Scott domains called information systems [ 171. 
In accordance with the cpo-theoretic tradition of domain theory, we present a version 
of default domain theory based directly on Scott domains (note that the use of Scott 
domains is purely for simplicity; we expect many results presented here to generalize 
to other classes of domains). 
Recall that a Scott domain (D, E) is a complete partial order (cpo) which is con- 
sistently complete: every bounded set has a least upper bound. The set of compact 
elements of a cpo D is written as K(D). Note that Scott domains are often assumed 
w-algebraic as well. Since the proof for Theorem 3.2 does not work as is if we 
assumed o-algebraicity, we dropped this condition for simplicity. However, this is not 
crucial since there are various ways to make everything work even if w-algebraicity is 
assumed. 
Notation. We will try to follow traditional notations in domain theory in this paper. 
For example, we write x t y, with respect to a domain D, if there exists an element 
in D which is above both x and y. In this case we call x and y compatible. 
Definition 2.1. Let (D, E) be a Scott domain. A default set is a subset /i of K(D) x 
K(D). We call a pair (a, b) E A a default and think of it as a rule 9. 
In the rest of the paper, we informally call a triple (D, C, A) a default domain. 
A rule like 9 intuitively means that if a is current and b is compatible, then b can 
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be added to the information state. Of course, this is very vague, and indeed there are 
several different ways to make this intuition precise. However, the general sense is that 
if ,4 is the default set, and x is an element in D, then we can use n to get to an 
element y 7 x, containing more information than x. Therefore, from an abstract point 
of view, a default set in a Scott domain (D, C) serves to generate a certain relation R 
on D which at least satisfies the property that (x, y) E R implies x & y. However, at 
this point default sets are low level objects which do not have internal structure. 
Perhaps the most important kind of relation generated from a default set is that of 
an extension, due to Reiter [12]. 
Definition 2.2. Let (D, II) be a Scott domain. Let /1 be a default set in D. Write x ry 
for x, y E D if 
Y = u dGY,Q, 
i20 
where 4(x, y, 0) = X, and 
&Gy,i+ 1) = 4(X,Y,i)UU{b I (a,b) E A&a E d+,Yri)&b r y} 
for all i > 0. When x Ty, we call y an extension of x. 
Here is an example to illustrate the basic idea of the definition. 
Example. Consider the scenario of finding out somebody’s last name if we have the 
partial information that the name starts with ‘sm’. Although we only have partial 
information, it would be a good guess if we say that the last name is ‘smith’. Thus, 
the pair (sm,smith) is a good candidate of a default rule (although smyth would be 
an exception). 
To be more specific, let’s consider the cpo of the complete binary tree, where the 
elements are labeled by binary strings of finite and infinite length, so that w & u if 
and only if w is a prefix of v. Let the default set be 
n := {(wll,wlll) 1 w is a finite binary string}. 
Intuitively, the defaults say that if we see two consecutive l’s, then mostly likely we 
will see another 1. The following are the typical pairs in the extension relation: 
(011,01”),(1101,1101),(1~,1~). 
To see 011 r Ol”, for example, one checks that 
qqOll,l”,O) = 011 
~(011,1”,1)=0111 
. . . 
$(Oll, l”,i) = Ol’+’ for i>O. 
Clearly, if /i is empty or the identity relation, then the extension relation is the 
identity relation. Also, for maximal elements m, like lw above, we always have m Tm. 
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This matches our intuition: if we already have perfect information, defaults can tell us 
nothing more. 
Note that although an extension is a certain fixed point, the definition only pro- 
vides a way to confirm one rather than to find one. An extension seems to build up 
in stages, but at each stage certain consistency with the extension must be checked. 
This is anomalous: to construct an extension, we must already have it! It is also this 
phenomenon that makes the extension relation nonmonotonic: if y is an extension of 
x and x’ 2 x, then y need not be an extension of x’. 
Do extensions always exist? What kind of properties does the extension relation 
have? Before answering these questions, we present a characterization of extensions. 
It generalizes an early result of Reiter’s. 
Theorem 2.1. For a Scott domain (D, 5) and a subset A g K(D) x K(D), we have 
xTy if and only if 
This theorem suggests that extensions can be characterized as a nesting of least fixed 
point and greatest fixed point. For a fixed domain D and default A, let 
i’(x,u,u)=xUU{bI(a,b)En&a~u&bTu}, 
r(x, 0) = rlct I t = 4(x, t, u>}. 
It is easy to check that for fixed x and u, 5(x, U, u) is a continuous function in u (we 
need to use the fact that the first components of LI are all compact). Therefore, 5(x, U, v) 
has a least fixed point I, such that r(x, I, u) = 1. However, n(x, u) is the greatest lower 
bound of all fixed points of &x,u,u) in u. This implies that 
Hence, by the previous theorem, finding an extension is equivalent to finding a fixed 
point of q(x,u) in v, so that 
&, r/(x, u), 0) = V(X, 0) = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. We prove a stronger result: for any y, 
i~~~(x,y,~)=n{tIt=xuU{bI(a,b)tn&act&bTy}}. 
/ 
We first show that 
i~odGryii) C n{t / t =xulJ{b I (a,b) E A&a C t&b T y}}. 
This is done by mathematical induction on i, to show that whenever 
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we have 4(x, y, i) L t for all i. Clearly 
4(x, Y, 0) L t. 
Suppose 
4(x, Y, i) C t. 
It is enough to show that 
l_{b I (a,b) E A&a L &x,y,i)&b T y) 
rrxuU{bI(a,b)En&act&bfy}. 
But this is clear from the assumption that 4(x, y,i) E t. 
We now show that 
ilJJ&x,ni) 2 fl{t I t =xul_{b I (a,b) E A&a C t&b T Y}}. 
This is done by demonstrating that uiBO 4(x, y,i) is one of the t’s, that is, 
j_JO&(x,~,i) =xuU b I (a,b) En&a Ci~O$ky,i)&b T Y . 
/ { 1 
However, the above follows from the fact that u’s are isolated elements and 
{&x,y,i) I i30) 
is an o-increasing chain. 0 
The following theorem summarizes some important properties of extensions for 
default domains. 
Theorem 2.2. Given a Scott domain D and a default set A, we have: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Extensions always exist. 
If xTy then y 7x. 
x Ty and y Tz if and only lf y = z. 
Zf x Tl”y and x Ty’, then either y = y’ or y y y’. 
Zf xTz and y Lz, then (x~y) Tz. 
Proof. The original proofs for these, in terms of information systems, are given in 
[14]. Because some results of this paper crucially depend on item 5, we give a proof 
for it in the order-theoretic setting. 
Suppose XTZ, which means that 
z = U f#$x,z, i). 
iEw 
We prove by mathematical induction that 
z = U $(xUy,z,i). 
IECU 
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C: Clearly, 4(x L! y, z, 0) E z by the assumption y C z. Suppose 4(x u y, z, i) C z. 
Then 
44~ U Y, z, i + 1) 
= 4(x U y, z, i) U U{b 
C 4(x U y, z, i) U U{b 
c z, 
where the last step follows from Theorem 2.1. Therefore, 4(x U y,z i) C z for every 
i>O. 
J: Obviously, 4(x U y, z, 0) 7 4(x, z, 0). Assume 4(x LJ y, z, i) 7 $(x,z, i). Then 
4(x U Y, z, i + 1) 
=~(xUy,z,i)UU{bI(a,b)En&ac~(xUy,z,i)&bTz} 
2 4(x, z, i) U U{b I (a,b) E A&a 5 4(-v, 4&b t z) 
= 4(x, z, i + 1). 
Therefore 4(x U y, z, i) J 4(x, z, i) for every i B 0. 0 
Remember that a default set in a Scott domain is just a set of pairs of com- 
pact elements. However, the basic idea of a default rule is to allow an agent to 
‘tjump to a certain conclusion”. This means not all defaults makes sense, and cer- 
tain forms of defaults may be useless. We are concerned in the remainder of this 
section about removing “useless” defaults and establish certain “normal forms” for 
defaults. 
Definition 2.3. Let /1, ,4’ be default sets in a Scott domain (D, L). We say that /i and 
/1’ are equivalent if they determine the same extension relation. 
The first kind of useless defaults are those of the form (u,b), where a is incompatible 
with b. The fact that we can safely remove them is confirmed in the following result, 
which is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.1. 
Proposition 2.1. Let (D, L, A) be a defuult domain. Then A and A’ are equivalent, 
where 
A’ := {(u,b) 1 (u,b) E A&u T b}. 
The second kind of useless defaults are those (a’, b)s where some (a, b) is already 
in /i with a C: u’. These defaults can also be removed. 
Proposition 2.2. Let (D, L, A) be a default domain and let (D, C) be finitury, i.e., 
each compact element dominates only finitely many compact elements. Then A and 
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A’ are equivalent, where 
A’ := A - {(a’,b) 1 (a’,b) E A&(a,b) E A for some a below a’}. 
The proof is straightforward: we can use (a, b) everywhere (a’, b) is used for con- 
structing an extension. However, note that the finitary condition on D is important here. 
Otherwise one could potentially remove all the pairs in ,4. 
Keeping in mind that the role of a default is to increase (hypothetical) information, 
we can further require that if (a, b) E A, then Q C 6. 
Proposition 2.3. Let (D, r, A) be a default domain. Then A is equivalent to some A’ 
with the property that 
(a, b) E A’ + a C b. 
To get A’, we simply replace each (a, b) in A by (a,aU b) and remove those (a, b)‘s 
where a and b are incompatible. According to the definition of an extension, we can 
see that A’ and A are equivalent. In the rest of the paper, we only consider defaults 
of the form (a, b) with a & b, although this restriction is not crucial in many cases. 
3. Abstract nonmonotonic entailment 
The purpose of this section is to introduce an abstract notion of a nonmonotonic 
entailment in a Scott domain and to show that default domains are representations of 
such entailments. Our axioms for the abstract nonmonotonic entailment is then justified 
semantically in the default domains. 
Entailments, in general, should work at the level of logical statements. In the domain 
logic paradigm [ 1,201, the correspondence goes from domains to types, open sets to 
properties, and points to computations. So, strictly speaking, entailments should be at 
the level of Scott open sets. However, we would like to gain a better understanding 
of the basic cases before going to a full fledged propositional version. For this reason, 
we consider nonmonotonic entailment between prime open sets of the form T x first, 
where n range over compact elements of the domain. As a further reduction of the 
overhead, we simply work on an entailment between compact elements. 
In the study of nonmonotonic consequences, the following axioms are often consid- 
ered. (By standard practice, X -+ Y is an abbreviation for Vb E Y, X -+ b.) 
Identity: a E X + X --+ a. 
Cautious monotony: X -+ a &X -+ b + X, a -+ b. 
Cut:X--tT&T,Y-+b+X,Y-+b. 
Cautiouscut:X-+T&T.X-+b+X-+b. 
For these axioms, X and Y range over finite sets of formulas, and a and b are single 
formulas. 
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Although Cut and Cautious cut are equivalent with the assumption of monotonicity, 
Cautious cut is strictly weaker without monotonicity. 
In our domain-theoretic setting, we wish to generalize axioms like the above. 
To this end we introduce the notion of an abstract nonmonotonic entailment in a Scott 
domain. Since we consider compact elements as formulas, and since the least upper 
bound of a finite set of compact elements remains compact, the abstract nonmonotonic 
entailments on a domain are just a certain kind of relations on the compact elements 
of the domain. 
Definition 3.1. Let (D, C) be a Scott domain. We call (D, C,-+) an abstract nonmono- 
tonic entailment if -+ is a relation on K(D) which satisfies the following requirements: 
0 Re$exiuity: a -4 a for all compact a; 
l Right Weakening: if a -+ b and c & b with c compact, then a -+ c; 
l Consistency: if a -+ b then a 1‘ b; 
l Right Conjunction: If F is a finite subset of K(D) and a --+ b for all b E F then 
a + u F (note that in particular F is consistent); 
l Cautious cut: If a -+ b and (a u b) -+ c then a -ut c. 
One special instance, for example, of an abstract nonmonotonic entailment is 
(D, C, 2). As the name suggests, monotonicity, which is stated as 
Monotonicity: a -+ b&a’ J a + a’ -v) b, 
does not hold in general for a nonmonotonic entailment. Here is a simple example. Let 
D be the truth-value cpo F-, with three elements t, f and l_ ordered in the standard 
way so that t and f are incomparable. Consider the relation 
--+ := {(I, f )} u Id,Fr, 
where Id,- is the identity relation on J c. One can check that this relation satisfies all 
the laws in the above definition, and yet it lacks monotonicity because we do not have 
t -+ f, although I L t. 
Note that Reflexivity and Right Weakening implies what Gardenfors and Makinson 
[5] call the axiom of Supraclassicality: 
Supraclassicality means that nonmonotonic entailment includes all classical entailments 
as special instances. 
The first four axioms for nonmonotonic entailment are self-explanatory. We explain 
the axiom of Cautious cut in more detail. In the literature there are at least two ad- 
ditional versions of cut rules, which appear in the following forms under the current 
context: 
l Cut: if a -+ b and b u b’ -+ c, then a u 6’ -+ c. 
l Cut’: if a --+ b and b --+ c, then a -+ c. 
Assuming monotonicity, we have the following. 
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Cut’ + Cut: If a -+ b and b u b’ -uv) c, then, by monotonicity, we have a u b’ -+ 
b LI b’. Now applying Cut’, we have a LI b’ -+ c. 
Cut =X Cautious cut: This follows without using monotonicity. 
Cautious cut + Cut’: Suppose a -+ b and b -+ c. Then a U b -+ c, by monotonicity. 
So a -9 c follows from Cautious cut. 
To summarize, the three different versions of cut are equivalent under the assumption 
of monotonicity. Without monotonicity, however, Cautious cut is strictly weaker than 
either of the other two cut rules. Here, it is informative to note that Supraclassicality and 
Cut’ together imply monotonicity. Therefore, for an abstract nonmonotonic entailment, 
Cut and Cut’ are equivalent, and either of them implies monotonicity. 
Also note the interesting connections with the general inference rules for linear logic. 
The cut rule, which expresses the categorical concept of composition, here is replaced 
with a natural rule one would expect without weakening. But so far our system bears 
only a superficial resemblance to linear logic; much more work is needed to determine 
any precise relations. 
We now show that a default domain (D, C, ,4) induces an abstract nonmonotonic 
entailment relation, via extensions. 
Given a default domain, we define a relation -+A by letting a -+A b if 
VY [a TY * b C ~1, 
where r is the extension relation for A. 
Theorem 3.1. Let (D, E, A) be a default domain. De$ne the triple (0, [T,-+,,), with 
a-+A b ifSa,b E K(D) and 
VY [a TY * b L ~1. 
Then (D, L,--+A) is an abstract nonmonotonic entailment. 
Proof. Reflexivity, Right Weakening, Consistency, and Right Conjunction follow rou- 
tinely from the definitions. For Cautious cut, use item 5 of Theorem 2.2. 0 
What is unexpected is that the converse of the above theorem is also true. Every 
abstract nonmonotonic entailment is faithfully recaptured by some default domain. 
Theorem 3.2. Let (D,L,-+) be an abstract nonmonotonic entailment. There is a 
default domain (D’, C’, A) with (D, C) a subdomain of (D’, C’), such that 
for a, b E x(D). Here, we call a domain (D, C) a subdomain of (D’, C’) if D is 
a subset of D’ such that 
XL ywx~‘y&x, LED. 
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To describe the construction needed in the proof, we introduce an auxiliary notion 
called the nonmonotonic consequence bound, which is defined as 
2 := U{b 1 a -N) 6). 
Nonmonotonic consequence bound always exist because by Right Conjunction, the set 
Z is directed. 
We now describe the construction. Start with an abstract nonmonotonic entailment 
(D, IZ, -+). We construct a default domain (D’, C’, A), where 
0 D’=Du{j2lxED}, with 2’s the new elements added to D in such a way that I? 
is the unique maximal immediately above x. 
. A = {(a,s) 1 a E K(D)}. 
Several remarks are in order. First, notice that all the new elements are compact. So, 
although ;li need not be compact, g always is, for compact a. This makes the set A a 
legitimate candidate for a default set. Secondly, all the new elements are incompatible 
with each other, and the only elements in D which are compatible with j; are in the 
set Ix. Thirdly, D is clearly a subdomain of D’, and lastly, D’ is Scott since the new 
elements are all incompatible - although D’ need not be o-algebraic even if D is. 
The following picture helps us to visualize this construction. The domain D’ looks 
like a new domain with lots of “hair” growing out of the old D. 
The proof that the above construction works for arbitrary default domains is achieved 
via several lemmas. 
Lemma 3.1. Let (D, L,-) be an abstract nonmonotonic entailment. For any element 
a E K(D), we have 
n{b 1 b E K(D)& b L a C b} = a. 
Proof. We clearly have a C a 5 Z. Therefore, 
n{bIbEic(D)&b&zC:b}C.iZ. 
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On the other hand, suppose b L II L-g. By Right Conjunction, {X 1 b --+ x} is 
a directed set whose least upper bound is b. Since a E K(D), we have a L bo for some 
bo such that b -+ bo. This implies, by Right Weakening, b -+ a. For any x E D, if 
a --+ x then a U b -N) x, as b C a. Therefore, b -+ x, by applying Cautious cut. This 
proves ;i C b. Hence, 
n{bIbErc(D)&b&z&b}7;i. 0 
Lemma 3.2. Given a, b E K(D), suppose that b C a C b. Then a 2”; in (D’, L’, A). 
Proof. This is because (b,g) is a member of A, and from the given assumption we 
have 
U&b& 
So, a r$ since g is a maximal element. 0 
The previous lemma shows that if b L a !& b, then g is an extension of a. The next 
lemma shows that all extensions of a are of this form. 
Lemma 3.3. Fix a E K(D). Every extension of a is of the form g with 
b E K(D) and b C a C b. 
Proof. Clearly every extension of a must be some g, because of the special kind of 
pairs of elements in A. We have to explain why such bs must have the properties 
mentioned in the lemma. It is easy to see that we have b & a; but we must also have 
a c b, because otherwise a and g will be incompatible. 0 
These lemmas lead to the proof for Theorem 3.2, as follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let (D, C,+) be an abstract nonmonotonic entailment, and let 
the default domain (D’, C’, A) be the one described earlier. 
Suppose a -N) b, and suppose y is an extension of a in D’. By the previous lemma, 
y = $ for some x E K(D) such that 
However, by Lemma 3.1, we have Z C Z. Hence, 
which shows that a -+A b. 
On the other hand, suppose a -+,t b for a, b E K(D). By the previous lemmas again, 
=. 
a IS an extension for a in D’. Therefore, b E %, which in turn implies that b !& 2 since 
b E D. This means a -+ b, by Right Weakening, the directedness of {q 1 a -+ q}, as 
well as the compactness of b. 0 
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Extensions are a complicated, non-inductive construction, whose computational cost 
is very high (we will try to elaborate this point in a future paper). Theorem 3.2 tells 
us that with a proper encoding of the defaults, it is possible to greatly simplify the 
construction of an extension, at least conceptually, while keeping the nonmonotonic 
entailment relation unchanged. In fact, for the default set used in the proof of Theo- 
rem 3.2, only one single ‘application’ of the default rules is sufficient for us to obtain 
an extension. Moreover, each extension is nothing more than a certain kind of non- 
monotonic bound. 
However, although Theorem 3.2 is of significant conceptual value, there are at least 
two potential obstacles that may keep it from being directly applicable in implemen- 
tation. One is that, in the construction of the default set ,4, we used pairs like (a,%), 
where iT need not be a compact element. So, the construction of D’ may transform 
a finitary domain D (in the sense that any compact element dominates only finitely 
many elements) to a non-finitary domain. This means that although z is compact, it 
may be required to code an ‘infinite amount’ of information. 
Is there a different construction, which avoids this problem, but still faithfully cap- 
tures the nonmonotonic entailment? This is, surprisingly, indeed possible, although the 
construction is slightly more complicated, and we need to iterate the application of 
defaults twice to get to an extension. We are not going to present that construction 
here, but only refer the reader to [ 191. 
The other issue is: what kind of domains are already good enough so we do not 
need to “grow the hair” out of them, as we did to get D’ from D? This is important 
because if we go back and forth a couple of times, between -w* and A, we do not want 
the domain to grow arbitrarily large. It is necessary to have somewhere to stop: i.e. a 
fixed point where no further maximal elements need to be added to the domain. 
These domains turn out to be just like the ones constructed earlier: they are called 
hairy domains. Intuitively, a hairy domain is one with enough maximal elements - at 
least as many maximals as non-maximals. 
Definition 3.2. Let (D, C) be a Scott domain. This domain is called hairy, if for each 
a E D, if a is not a compact maximal element, then there is a compact maximal 
element m, E D such that 
‘dx E D [x C m, +- x 5 a]. 
In other words, a is the element immediately below the maximal element m,. 
Note that all flat domains are hairy. But hairy domains need not be flat: extending 
the truth-value cpo 5 mentioned earlier with a new element on top of t gives rise to 
a non-flat, hairy domain. Of course, there exist domains which are not hairy, such as 
the diamond shaped cpo. 
Proposition 3.1. Let (D,&,-+) be an abstract nonmonotonic entailment and (D,C) 
a hairy Scott domain. Then there is a default set A such that the nonmonotonic 
entailment determined by the default domain (D,&,A) is the same us -+. 
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We omit the proof similar to that of Theorem 3.2, but indicate the default set needed: 
n := {(a,%) /u E K(D)}, 
where j; = x if x is a maximal and j; = m, if x is a non-maximal. Here, m, is a 
maximal element immediately above X. 
4. Cumulativity 
Let (D, E,-+) be an abstract nonmonotonic entailment on a Scott domain D. 
The relation -+ is said to be cumulative if it satisfies the axiom of cautious monotony: 
Intuitively, cautious monotony says that if from a one expects both b and c, then one 
should still expect c if b becomes current. 
Cautious monotony is a nice property to have because it makes the nonmonotonic 
entailment cumulative: if from a one expects many things, and if nothing unexpected 
happens, then none of the expected needs to be withdrawn. 
Since Gabbay [4], a considerable amount of work has been devoted to the study of 
cumulativity. As mentioned earlier, our work here differs from other work in the fol- 
lowing fundamental way: the other work assumes cautious monotony, and then searches 
for models having this property. Although models which capture cautious monotony do 
exist, they appear to be somewhat artificial. Our starting point is, in contrast, the idea 
of defaults as used in default logic, seemingly unrelated to cautious monotony. Does 
the nonmonotonic entailment relation -+A derived from a default domain (D, C, A) 
satisfy cautious monotony? The next example shows that it does not have to. 
Example. Consider the default set 
{(a, b), (a’, b’)) 
on the following Scott domain. 
b b’ 
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We have a -+ b, from which it follows that a -+ a’. However, we do not have 
a U a’ -+ b because a U a’ = a’, and there are two incompatible extensions for a’, i.e., 
b and b’. 
It can also be seen from the above example that cumulativity is fragile for A with 
respect to set inclusion. For example, if we add to A a pair (a, b’), or remove from it 
the pair (a’, b’), the induced relation -vv, becomes cumulative. 
The question now is: what kind of a default set induces a cumulative entailment 
relation? In the subsections to follow, we provide various useful characterizations for 
cumulativity. 
4.1. Cumulativity and nonmonotonic closure 
In ordinary logic, there is a useful notion called deductive closure of a set of for- 
mulae, defined as {b ) X t- b}. We have, in the nornnonotonic case, also used a certain 
nonmonotonic closure operator, defined as Z := U{b ( a -+ b}. For convenience, we 
still call - a closure operator although it need not have the property that a = Z 
The next theorem shows that cumulativity amounts to equality between nonmonotonic 
closures of certain elements. 
Theorem 4.1. Let (D,C,-+) be a nonmonotonic entailment. Then -+ is cumulative if 
and only if the following condition holds for the nonmonotonic closure: 
Note that we get lb C ii for free from Lemma 3.1. So the above theorem says that 
cumulativity is equivalent to 
Proof. Only if: Suppose -+ satisfies the axiom of cautious monotony, and suppose 
a E b 5 a. We know from the condition b G a that a -+ b. If a -+ x, then a LI b -+ x, 
by cautious monotony. However, a U b = b, so b -WI x. This means Z E b. 
I’: On the other hand, suppose 
for compact elements a, b E D. If x -+ y and x -v* z, then 
Therefore, j; & xry by assumption. Now, x -+ z implies z E K. Hence x u y -+ z. 0 
Note that although this theorem is a characterization of cumulativity, it is not very 
helpful for deciding cumulativity from a default set directly. 
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4.2. Deterministic defaults 
Let (D, &, A) be a default domain. We call A a deterministic default set if 
0 [(a,b),(a’,b’)EA&aEa’Eb]*a=a’, 
l [(a,b),(u’,b’) E A & aru’ & bTb’] + [a = a’ & b = b’]. 
The example given earlier for illustrating non-cumulativity is not a deterministic 
default set. Our next result shows that deterministic default sets induce a cumula- 
tive nonmonotonic entailment relation. However, we do not at the moment have a 
good motivating example for deterministic default sets, other than that it ensures 
cumulativity. 
Proposition 4.1. Suppose (D, !I, A) is a default domain with A deterministic. Then 
the nonmonotonic entailment -+A is cumulative. 
The proof becomes very easy once the conditions for determinacy are digested. They 
ensure that in the process of building any extension for an element x in D, at most 
one default is ever applicable; further, the inductive construction terminates at stage 
1 at the latest. Now suppose x -+ y and x -rr) z. To show that (X U y) -+ z, note 
that a default rule is applicable to x if and only if it is applicable to x U y, because 
at most one default rule is applicable, and (because x -+ y) x C x LI y L u for any 
extension u of x. This means x and x U y have the same extension sets. Therefore, 
(x u y) -vv) z. 
4.3. Precondition-free defuults 
There is a simple and yet very useful class of defaults considered in the litera- 
ture, called precondition-free defaults. For a default domain (D, &, A), A is called 
precondition-free if for each (a, b) in A, a = 1. 
The next result is the observation that precondition free structures give rise to a 
nonmonotonic relation supporting cautious monotony. 
Lemma 4.1. Let (D, g, A) be a default domain, where A is precondition-free. 
Then y is an extension of x tf and only tf there is a subset B of z,A (where 7~2 
is the projection to the second coordinate) which is 
l maximal with the property that x is compatible with B, and 
. y=xUuB. 
The proof is straightforward from definition, but Lemma 4.1 is the key to the fol- 
lowing theorem. 
Theorem 4.2. Suppose (D, C, A) is a precondition-free default domain. Define the 
triple 
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with a-+ b if a,b E K(D) and 
Vy.[a 7-y =+ b c y]. 
Then -+ is a cumulative entailment on (D, L). 
Proof. Let x y-, y and x -+ z. We want x U y --+ z. Suppose that t is an extension of 
x U y. Then by the previous lemma, there is a maximal subset B of rc~A compatible 
with x u y, such that t = x LI y u u B. We want to show that z C u. It suffices to show 
that x U u B is an extension of x. If x U u B is not an extension of x, it is because 
B is not maximal in the sense of Lemma 4.1. That is, there is some maximal C, a 
proper superset of B, compatible with x, and such that w = x U u C is an extension 
of X. By hypothesis, y E w, and we already have x 5 w. So C is a larger set than 
B, but compatible with x U y, violating the maximality of B. This contradiction proves 
that t is an extension of x. Thus z C t, as desired. 0 
4.4. Unique extensions and cumulativity 
It turns out that cumulativity is closely related to the uniqueness of extensions. 
In fact, uniqueness of extensions characterizes cumulativity: If there exists only one 
extension for every x E D, then the induced entailment is cumulative, and moreover, 
each cumulative entailment is determined by a default set which produces unique ex- 
tensions. This is stated precisely in the following representation result. 
Theorem 4.3. Suppose (D, II, A) is a default domain for which extensions are unique. 
Then the induced nonmonotonic entailment --+ is cumulative. If, on the other hand, 
(D, IZ,-+) is a cumulative entailment, then there exists a super default domain which 
induces -N) in the sense of Theorem 3.2; moreover, extensions are unique in this default 
domain. 
Proof. The first statement follows from item 5 of Theorem 2.2 and the unique extension 
property. 
The second statement follows from the proof of the representation theorem - Theo- 
rem 3.2, and Theorem 4.1. 0 
To check that the induced nonmonotonic entailment for a default domain (D, C, A) 
is cumulative, it is sufficient to show that extensions are unique. However, it is clear 
that we need an effective procedure for determining when a default set determines 
unique extensions, because the definition for extensions is not helpful. In the rest of 
this section we present a characterization result for this purpose. 
In [ 191 an effective, sufficient condition is given for unique extensions. However, 
that condition is not necessary. We now give a very simple condition which is both 
sufficient and necessary for unique extensions on coherent Scott domains (an effective 
characterization of unique extensions on general Scott domains remains unsolved). Re- 
call that a Scott domain (D, L) is coherent if for every subset X of D, the compatibility 
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of every pair of elements in X implies the compatibility of the whole set X. Note that in 
the following theorem we assume that if (a,b) is a pair in a default set /i, then a C b. 
Theorem 4.4. Let A be an abstract default set in a coherent Scott domain D. Then 
extensions are unique for A if and only iffor every pair (a, b), (a’, b’) in A, if a T a’, 
then 
[(a U a’) r b & (a u a’) T b’] + b T b’. 
To better understand the theorem, we explain why it does not hold for non-coherent 
Scott domains, and why the condition cannot be replaced by a more familiar one, such 
as 
a 7 a’ + b T b’. 
Answers to both questions can be found in the two examples below. 
Example. Consider this typical non-coherent Scott domain. 
The default set {(I, bl ), (I, bz)} clearly satisfies the 
ever, there are two extensions for x. 
condition in the theorem. How- 
Example. Consider the next Scott domain, which is coherent. 
The default set {(at, bl),(az, 62)) generates unique extensions in this domain. How- 
ever, the condition 
ata’+btb 
does not hold. 
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We now go back to the proof of Theorem 4.4. It involves a canonical way for 
building an extension. Given a default domain (D, c,A), extensions can be constructed 
in the following way for a given element x in D. 
Let x0 =x. For each i > 0, let xi E D be such that 
x; = xi--] u U{b 1 (a,b) E A & a c xi-I & b 1‘ xi} 
There may exist more than one such Xis to make the above equality hold. But we only 
have to make sure that such xis indeed exist. All we need to do is to pick the least 
upper bound b of a maximal compatible subset B of 
such that B T (xi-1 }, and take Xi = xi-1 ub. The existence of such a set B is guaranteed 
by Zorn’s lemma applied not to the ordering L but to the inclusion order on subsets 
having the above properties. It is easy to see that {xi ( i 3 0} is an increasing chain. 
Let m: = UiEo x,. We can show, by mathematical induction, that 
m = U $(x, m, i), 
iEOJ 
which means m is an extension of x. 
The above procedure tells us that certain extensions can be built up as the least 
upper bound of an increasing chain of fixed points of some operators. The difficult 
direction of the proof of the theorem shows that if the domain D is coherent, then 
every extension, and consequently the only extension, of an element must be built in 
this way. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. rf’: We prove that for any x in D, there is a maximum among 
the subsets B of 
{b 1 (u,b) E A & a C x} 
such that {x} U B is compatible. Consider the set 
For any b,, b2 in this set, there are at, ~2, both below x, such that (al, bl ), (~2, b2) are 
in A. Moreover, (ai Lluz)? bl, and (ai Uu2) T b2. Therefore, by the condition given in 
Theorem 4.4, we have bl T b2. This means, by coherence of D, that M is the largest 
set among the subsets B of 
{b 1 (a, 6) E A & a L x} 
such that {x} U B is compatible. 
Now we can complete the proof of the If direction. For each d E D let M(d) be the 
maximal set A4 constructed in the previous paragraph; this notation just makes clear 
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the dependence of M on d. We want to show that each x has a unique extension. 
Fix x, and define a sequence ma, ml,. . as follows. Put mo = x, and 
mi+i = mi U UM(mi). 
This gives an increasing sequence, and as in the remarks before the proof, the least 
upper bound m of this sequence is an extension of x. But now let e be any other 
extension of x; then 
e = U 4(Lx,e) 
by the definition of extension. By induction, it is straightforward that for each i 
440,e) C mi. 
Therefore e L m, and it follows by Theorem 2.2(4) that e = m. 
Only if: On the other hand, suppose for some (al, bi),(a~,bz) in /i such that al Ta2 
we have (ai u ~2) 7 bl, and (ai u ~2) 1‘ b2. We must have bl t b2 for otherwise there 
are clearly at least two extensions for al U ~2. 0 
5. Daisy domains 
In the previous section we have studied various sufficient conditions for a default set 
to induce a cumulative nonmonotonic entailment. In this section we study cumulativity 
along a different dimension: the underlying domain. 
What kind of Scott domains (D, L) guarantee that when they are coupled with default 
sets the induced nonmonotonic entailments are always cumulative? 
Of course, we must rule out the domain structure presented in the counterexample to 
cumulativity in the previous section. Luckily enough, that also turns out to be sufficient. 
Definition 5.1. A Scott domain (D, E) is daisy if for each x, y E D, we have 
xyy*xrly=1. 
As the name suggests, a daisy domain is one which branches out only at the root. 
It can be seen as the smash sum of a collection of lattices, and it need not be the 
result of expanding each point of a flat domain to a lattice. From an aerial perspective 
the domain looks like a daisy. Clearly, all lattices are daisy domains. 
The main theorem of this section is the following. 
Theorem 5.1. A Scott domain (D, C) is daisy if and only if for each default set 
A in D, the induced nonmonotonic entailment is cumulative. 
The following lemma, whose easy proof is omitted, is used in our proof. This lemma 
says that if y is an extension of x, and the only extension of t, strictly in between x 
and y, is y, then the nonmonotonic entailment determined by r is cumulative. 
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Lemma 5.1. Let (D, E, A) be a default domain. Then -+A is cumulative if for each 
x, y, t, u in D, 
[xTy&(xCtCy)&tTu]*u=y. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. If: Suppose (D,C) is a Scott domain such that any default 
set in it induces a cumulative nonmonotonic entailment. Given an incompatible pair 
of elements x, y in D, clearly n fl y is strictly below both x and y. Let a be any 
fixed compact element with a C x n y. We can find compact elements x0, ya such 
that xo C x, yo C y, xo y ya, and, moreover, a 5 x0 n yo. Now consider the default 
set {( _L,xo), (a, ~0)). We know that for this set to induce a cumulative nonmonotonic 
entailment, a must be the bottom. This shows that any compact element below x n y 
is the bottom. Therefore, x fl y itself must be the bottom. 
Only if: Consider a default domain (D, c,A), where (D, L) is daisy. If y is an 
extension of x, and x C t L y, then the only extension of t is y, since (D, C) is 
daisy. Here we also need to use the basic fact about extensions mentioned in Theorem 
2.2: different extensions for the same element are incompatible. By Lemma 5.1, +,4 
is cumulative. q 
Unlike hairy Scott domains, daisy domains have better structural properties: they can 
be made Cartesian closed. We spend the rest of the section showing this result. 
To show Cartesian closure, we must first be precise about the category we are con- 
cerned with. The objects of the category are, of course, daisy domains. The morphisms 
of the category are super-strict continuous functions. 
Definition 5.2. Let D, E be daisy domains. A continuous function f : D + E is called 
super-strict if 
unless f itself is the bottom, i.e., it maps everything to the bottom. 
Clearly, a super-strict function does not just map the bottom to the bottom; if it 
sends any non-bottom element to the bottom, then it sends all elements to the bottom. 
This is a significant difference from the conventional strict functions which can send 
some non-bottom elements to the bottom but not the others. 
It is routine to check that indeed we have a category: super-strict functions compose, 
and the identities are super-strict. 
Finite products and function space can be introduced for daisy domains. Let D, E be 
daisy domains. For convenience, we use D- to denote the resulting set by removing 
the bottom from D. The smash product of D and E is the cpo D xl E, whose set of 
elements is 
(D- x E-) u {i}, 
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with i the least element, under the componentwise ordering: (x,y) C (x’, y’) if and 
only if x C x’ and y L y’. 
The super-strict function space of D and E is the cpo D --ii E, whose set of 
elements is 
[D- + E-1 u {Ax. i}, 
where 
l D- -+ E- stands for the collection of continuous functions from D- to E-, but 
each such function can be regarded as one from D to E, by sending ID to IE, 
l the ordering is given by f 5 g H ‘vx E D. f(x) E g(x). 
Perhaps we should say a word about the notation +‘. Usually, -+I is a notation 
for the strict function space. Our notation clearly makes it “super-strict”. 
The following result shows that smash product and super-strict function space pre- 
serve daisy domains. 
Proposition 5.1. Zf D and E are daisy domains, then so are D XI E and D -+l E. 
Proof. Clearly D XI E and D -+l E are Scott domains. We need to show that the glb 
of incompatible elements is the bottom. 
For the smash product, let (x, y), (x’, y’) be incompatible elements. Then either x,x’ 
are incompatible, or y, y’ are incompatible. Since D and E are daisy, either x n x’ = ID, 
or y n y’ = 1~. This means the glb of (x, y) and (x’, y’) cannot be any element of 
the form (a,b), where a and b are non-bottom. So the only possibility for the glb of 
(x,y) and (x’, y’) is 1. 
For the super-strict function space, let f,g be incompatible functions. Then there 
is some non-bottom element x0 in D, such that f(xo) and g(x0) are incompatible. 
Otherwise, we can let h(x) := f(x) LJ g(x) f or x E D, and this would be an upper 
bound of f and g in the super-strict function space. As the ordering is pointwise, any 
lower bound I for f and g must satisfy I(x) C f(x) n g(x) for all x in D. Since E 
is daisy, /(xc) = 1~. So f n g = 1. (Recall that if a super-strict function sends any 
non-bottom element to the bottom, then it sends everything to the bottom.) 0 
Moreover, one can show that D xl E is the product, and the one point domain is 
the initial object in our category. 
Theorem 5.2 (Cartesian closure). For daisy domains D, E and F, we have 
Hom(D XI E, F) ?z Hom(D, [E -+l F]). 
Proof (sketch). It is enough to show that there is a one-one correspondence between 
the non-bottom elements of D xl E +I F and D -+l [E +I F]. 
For each non-bottom element f in D XI E +I F, we get a continuous function 
f- in D- x E- + F-, where x and --) are standard product and function space 
constructions. Clearly, f- corresponds to a function in D- + [E- 3 F-1 (note that 
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[E +l F]- ” E- 4 F-) by the standard currying operation. One can check that this 
induces a one-one correspondence. 0 
Two remarks are in order. One is that although Cartesian closure is an important 
idea in programming semantics, its relevance to default reasoning is unclear. The other 
remark is that our proof above is apparently related to bottomless cpos. It may be 
better to work in the framework of bottomless cpos directly and then obtain our result 
as a corollary; but we have not looked at this. 
6. Nonmonotonic entailment on open sets 
We now turn to an investigation on extending nonmonotonic entailment to open sets, 
considered as properties in general, as in the setting of domain logics. 
Given two open sets a, /3 in a Scott domain (D, C), when can we say that r non- 
monotonically entails b with respect to a default set A? There is a general consen- 
sus among researchers in nonmonotonic reasoning that a notion of “only knowing” 
is needed. One jumps to the conclusion that Tweety flies from the information that 
Tweety is a bird. However, this reasoning is not valid if the reasoner knows that, in 
fact, Tweety is a penguin, an additional piece of information he puts aside. Our inter- 
pretation of “only knowing” is naturally “only having information” with respect to the 
background informational ordering of the Scott domain. Only knowing the property X, 
therefore, translates into the information captured by the minimal points of a, written 
as PX. 
It should be pointed out that the notion of “only knowing” should be a local con- 
cept. To be realistic, one always has other knowledge, or information, or even other 
beliefs. Nevertheless, one can still conclude that Tweety flies with the additional in- 
formation that Spot is a puppy. A more precise notion of only knowing should also 
deal with the notion of “independence”, the idea that two pieces of information are 
not related. This has been discussed in the probabilistic literature (e.g., [ 1 l]), but not 
extensively in the logical literature. All of this may be better treated in a version of 
first order logic. The present paper, however, takes the simple minded view of “only 
knowing”. 
Definition 6.1. Let (D, &,A) be a default domain, and let cc,/3 be Scott open sets in 
(D, C). We say that a nonmonotonically entails /I in this default domain if for every 
minimal point x in CI (x E pa), every extension of x is in 8. 
By this definition, if x is the empty open set, then a -+ p for any open set p, since 
z does not have any minimal point. However, this is an uninteresting case. As pointed 
out in the introduction, cautious monotony fails for nonmonotonic entailment which 
involves disjunctive information. For the sake of completeness, we restate the example 
in pure order-theoretic terms. 
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Consider the domain 
Intuitively we want p to stand for “being a penguin”, and f for “fly”. Choose for 
a default set 
Then we have true -yut f and true -vu) f V p, but f V p does not -rv) f. (For simplicity, 
we misused notation here: such as true for T-L and V for U.) This example points to 
a general pattern of reasoning where cautious monotony seems to fail. 
The next example shows that cautious cut can fail as well. First, add a new atom w 
to the domain above, and new elements showing that w is consistent both with f and 
7. Let cp be w V 7, c( = w V f, and /I = f. Take for a default set 
{(Lf >>(LW)) 
The minimal points of cp are w and 7. For cp A CI the unique minimal point is w. This 
has the unique extension w u f, so cp A c( -w) J?. Also, the extensions of the minimal 
points of cp are w u f and w LIT, respectively. In both of these w holds, so that c~ -+ CI. 
But q does not -+ /?, since we have the extension w U 7. 
The problem here is that by moving to a minimal point of cp A CI we are forgetting 
the information in w U f and w U f which we had when we were figuring out the 
conjunction. The second of these models would block the extension w U f. 
Is this counterexample a realistically valid one? Imagine that w stands for a property 
that the typical bird has, like “wingspan less than 6 feet”; and f stands for the property 
of flying. Using a new atom b for “bird”, we could reason as follows: Suppose that 
birds normally fly, and birds normally have wingspans less than 6 feet. Using intuitive 
reasoning, it seems that from b A (w V 7) we could jump to the conclusion b A w. It 
also seems reasonable to accept b A w -yy, f. But from b A (w V f) -vu) b A w we get by 
weakening b A (w V 7) -+ (b A w) V (b A f ). Let c1 be the formula (b A w) V (b A f ), 4 
be the formula b A (w V T), and /I be f. Then 4 A CI is equivalent to b A w, from which 
we conclude f. But from (b A w) V (b A 7) it does not seem altogether reasonable 
to conclude f because of the case b A 7. This counterexample, though, is not as 
convincing to us as the one just above. 
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The previous examples indicate that nonmonotonic entailment on open sets satisfies 
neither cautious monotony nor cautious cut. We now want to say something affirmative 
about the nonmonotonic entailment relation on stable neighborhoods (Scott open sets 
whose minimal points are pairwise incompatible; see [20]) by assuming the property 
of unique extensions. 
The following is a collection of laws that hold in this case. Note that stable neigh- 
borhoods are disjoint, so that whenever we write p V q, we implicitly also mean that 
p A q = false. Note that d stands for strict entailment, and = is the derived equiv- 
alence. When we write p <q, we mean p is a subset of q (the smaller the open 
set, the more information we have). As usual, &, +, and H are reserved for our 
meta-language. 
Theorem 6.1. Let p,q,r range over stable neighborhoods in a default domain with 
unique extensions. Then the following results hold. 
l Supraclassicality: p d q * p -3 q. 
l Left Logical Equivalence: ( p = q) & ( p -+ Y) + q --v, r. 
l Right Weakening: (p --+ q)&(q<r) + p -+ r. 
0 Cautious Cut: (p -+ q)&(p A q -N) r) + p -+ r. 
l Cautious Monotony: (p -9 q)&(p -+ r) =+ p A q -+ r, where q is disjunction-free. 
l Right And: ( p -+q)&(p-+r)*(p-+qAr). 
l Left Or: (p V q) -+r*(p-+r)Aq--,r. 
l Right Or: p * (4 V r) * (p -“* 4) V (p -n* r). 
Proof. We verify Cautious Monotony and Cautious Cut. 
Cautious Monotony: Suppose p -4 q, p -+ r in a default domain (D, L, _4), where 
p,q,r are stable neighborhoods, with q disjunction-free, and extensions are unique. 
Since stable neighborhoods are preserved under binary intersection, p A q remains a 
stable neighborhood. Let x be a minimal point of p A q, and let y be the extension 
for x. Clearly any minimal point of pAq is of the form aUb, where a E pp and b is the 
unique minimal point of q. We know that the extension of a, say e, is in q, and hence, 
So a C a U b L e. By the unique extension property (see Section 4.4), the only ex- 
tension of x must be e. From the assumption p -+ r we have e E r. Therefore, any 
extension of a minimal element of p A q belongs to r, which was what we wanted. 
Note that q being disjunction-free (hence having a unique minimal element) is crucial 
for cautious monotony. One can easily construct examples where cautious monotony 
fails when q is not disjunction-free, as we have seen earlier. In [16], we proved 
that cautious monotony holds for precondition-free defaults, again assuming that q 
is disjunction-free. 
Cautious Cut: As before, let m be a minimal element of p, and e the extension of 
m. Since p -+ q, e 111 n for some n E q and so 
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Again by the unique extension property, e is an extension of m u n as well. Therefore, 
e E r. This means p -+ r. 
In fact, cautious cut follows from either the property of unique extension or the 
property of disjointness of stable neighborhoods individually. The above verification 
did not use disjointness of stable neighborhoods. A proof that cautious cut follows 
from disjointness of stable neighborhoods can be found in [ 161. 
Finally, note that Right Or only holds when extensions are unique. 0 
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